Audit a DKIM selector from a received message
Audit DKIM from a representative received message: verify the trusted receiver verdict, read the selector (s=) and signing domain (d=), resolve the exact selector DNS path, then compare d= with the visible From domain under DMARC alignment. A DNS key alone does not prove that this message passed DKIM or aligned for DMARC.
Flash separates three questions that need different fixes: did the trusted receiver report a valid DKIM signature, did the selector lookup built from s= and d= resolve to one usable public-key path, and did the authenticated d= domain align with the visible From domain? RFC 6376 defines the signature and selector lookup; RFC 8301 updates acceptable algorithms and key sizes; RFC 9989 defines relaxed and strict DKIM alignment for DMARC. Keeping those verdict, DNS and alignment findings separate prevents a passing key lookup from hiding a broken signature or an unrelated signing domain.
Primary sources for this guidance
- RFC 6376 — DomainKeys Identified Mail Signatures
- RFC 8301 — DKIM cryptographic algorithm and key usage update
- RFC 9989 — Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
- Gmail email sender guidelines
- Microsoft 365 DKIM configuration
- Folderly Flash scoring and privacy methodology
How to fix it
- Open the delivered message's Authentication-Results and DKIM-Signature headers. Record the trusted receiver's DKIM verdict plus the exact s= selector and d= signing domain; do not infer them from the visible From address or a control-panel screenshot.
- Build the lookup name as selector._domainkey.signing-domain, using s= for the selector and d= for the signing domain from that same signature. Follow an intentional CNAME chain to its final TXT key, but treat a missing target, loop, multiple competing key records, invalid tag set or empty p= value as a selector-DNS problem.
- Check the key and algorithm against current DKIM guidance. RFC 8301 requires at least 1024-bit RSA for signing and recommends 2048 bits; use a supported modern algorithm and a larger key where the DNS and sending platform support it.
- Compare d= with the visible From domain under the domain's published DMARC adkim mode. Relaxed alignment allows the same organizational domain; strict alignment requires an exact domain match. A DKIM pass with an unrelated d= domain does not provide aligned DKIM for DMARC.
- Assign the fix to the correct owner. The domain owner controls directly published selector DNS; the sending platform controls signing, provider-hosted target keys and tenant-specific CNAME values. For Microsoft 365, retrieve both current selector CNAME values from the tenant rather than constructing targets from an example.
- If DNS is correct but the trusted receiver reports fail, compare the signed headers and body hash with the delivered message. An indirect relay, security gateway or list can change signed content after signing; repair the signing or relay path rather than republishing an unchanged key.
- Keep the active selector during rotation until comparable production-path messages pass with the replacement. Then retire only keys no legitimate stream still uses; one message cannot inventory every sender or selector.
- After DNS propagation or a sending-platform change is observable, send one fresh message through the same production path. Confirm receiver DKIM pass, selector DNS success and DMARC alignment as separate outcomes before closing the task.
Limitations
Flash audits the DKIM evidence available for one received message and its visible selector path. It cannot inventory every sender, selector or retired key, inspect a provider control plane, prove why an indirect relay changed a signature, or guarantee inbox placement.